The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S) involves assigning students to projects based on student preferences over projects, lecturer preferences over students, and the maximum number of students that each project and lecturer can accommodate. This classical model assumes that preference lists are strictly ordered. Here, we study a generalisation of SPA-S where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers, which we refer to as the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students with Ties (SPA-ST). We investigate stable matchings under the most robust definition of stability in this context, namely super-stability. We describe the first polynomial-time algorithm to find a super-stable matching or to report that no such matching exists, given an instance of SPA-ST. Our algorithm runs in O(L) time, where L is the total length of all the preference lists. Finally, we present results obtained from an empirical evaluation of the linear-time algorithm based on randomlygenerated SPA-ST instances. Our main finding is that, whilst super-stable matchings can be elusive, the probability of such a matching existing is significantly higher if ties are restricted to the lecturers' preference lists.
Introduction
The Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA) [6, 17] involves sets of students, projects and lecturers, where students are to be assigned to projects offered by lecturers. Applications of SPA can be found in many university departments, for example, the School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow [16] , the Faculty of Science, University of Southern Denmark [6] , the Department of Computing Science, University of York [15] , and elsewhere [3, 5, 9] . In this setting, lecturers provide a list of projects, and students are required to rank a subset of these projects that they find acceptable, in order of preference. Typically there may be upper bounds on the number of students that each project and lecturer can accommodate. Considering the preferences and the capacities of projects and lecturers, the problem then is to find a matching (i.e., an assignment of students to projects such that each student is assigned at most one project, and the capacity constraints on projects and lecturers are not violated), which is optimal in some sense according to the stated preferences.
In this work, we will concern ourselves with a variant of SPA that involves lecturer preferences over students, which is known as the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S). In this context, it has been argued [22] that a natural property for a matching to satisfy is that of stability. Informally, a stable matching ensures that no student and lecturer who are not matched together would rather be assigned to each other than remain with their current assignees. Such a pair would have an incentive to form a private arrangement outside of the matching, undermining its integrity. Other variants of SPA in the literature involve lecturer preferences over their proposed projects [14, 19, 20] , lecturer preferences over (student, project) pairs [2] , and no lecturer preferences at all [16] . See [6] for a recent survey.
The classical SPA-S model assumes that preferences are strictly ordered. However, this might not be achievable in practice. For instance, a lecturer may be unable or unwilling to provide a strict ordering of all the students who find her projects acceptable. Such a lecturer may be happier to rank two or more students equally in a tie, which indicates that the lecturer is indifferent between the students concerned. This leads to a generalisation of SPA-S which we refer to as the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecture preferences over Students with Ties (SPA-ST). If we allow ties in the preference lists of students and lecturers, different stability definitions naturally arise. Suppose M is a matching in an instance of SPA-ST. Informally, we say M is weakly stable, strongly stable or super-stable if there is no student and lecturer such that if they decide to form an arrangement outside the matching, respectively, (i) both of them would be better off, (ii) one of them would be better off and the other no worse off, (iii) neither of them would be worse off.
With respect to this informal definition, clearly a super-stable matching is strongly stable, and a strongly stable matching is weakly stable. These concepts were first defined and studied by Irving [10] in the context of the Stable Marriage problem with Ties, and subsequently extended to the Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (HRT) [11, 12] (where HRT is the special case of SPA-ST in which each lecturer offers only one project, and the capacity of each project is the same as the capacity of the lecturer offering the project).
Considering the weakest of the three stability concepts mentioned above, every instance of SPA-ST admits a weakly stable matching (this follows by breaking the ties in an arbitrary fashion and applying the stable matching algorithm described in [1] to the resulting SPA-S instance). However, such matchings could be of different sizes [18] . Thus opting for weak stability leads to the problem of finding a weakly stable matching that matches as many students to projects as possi-Proposition 1. Let I be an instance of SPA-ST, and let M be a matching in I. Then M is super-stable in I if and only if M is stable in every instance of SPA-S obtained from I by breaking the ties in some way.
In a practical setting, suppose that a student s i has incomplete information about two or more projects and decides to rank them equally in a tie T , and a super-stable matching M exists in the corresponding SPA-ST instance I, where s i is assigned to a project in T . Then M is stable in every instance of spa-s (obtained from I by breaking the ties) that represents the true preferences of s i . Consequently, we will focus on the concept of super-stability in the SPA-ST context.
Unfortunately not every instance of SPA-ST admits a super-stable matching. This is true, for example, in the case where there are two students, two projects and one lecturer, where the capacity of each project is 1, capacity of the lecturer is 2, and every preference list is a single tie of length 2. Nonetheless, it should be clear from the discussion above that a super-stable matching should be preferred in practical applications when one does exist.
Irving et al. [11] described an algorithm to find a super-stable matching given an instance of HRT, or to report that no such matching exists. However, merely reducing an instance of SPA-ST to an instance of HRT and applying the algorithm described in [11] to the resulting HRT instance does not work in general (we explain this further in Sect. 2.3).
Our Contribution. In this paper, we describe the first polynomial-time algorithm to find a super-stable matching or to report that no such matching exists, given an instance of SPA-ST -thus solving an open problem given in [1, 17] . Our algorithm runs in time linear in the size of the problem instance. The remaining sections of this paper are structured as follows. We give a formal definition of the SPA-S problem, the SPA-ST variant, and the super-stability concept in Sect. 2. We describe our algorithm for SPA-ST under super-stability in Sect. 3. Further, Sect. 3 also presents our algorithm's correctness results and some structural properties satisfied by the set of super-stable matchings in an instance of SPA-ST. In Sect. 4, we present results arising from an empirical evaluation that investigates how the nature of the preference lists would affect the likelihood of a super-stable matching existing, with respect to randomly-generated SPA-ST instances. Our main finding is that the probability of a super-stable matching existing is significantly higher if ties are restricted to the lecturers' preference lists. Finally, Sect. 5 presents some concluding remarks and potential direction for future work.
Preliminary definitions

Formal definition of SPA-S
An instance I of SPA-S involves a set S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n1 } of students, a set P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n2 } of projects and a set L = {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l n3 } of lecturers. Each student s i ranks a subset of P in strict order. We denote by A i the ranked set of projects that s i finds acceptable. We say that s i finds p j acceptable if p j ∈ A i .
Each lecturer l k ∈ L offers a non-empty set of projects P k , where P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n3 partitions P. Lecturer l k provides a preference list, which we denote by L k , ranking in strict order of preference those students who find at least one project in P k acceptable. Also l k has a capacity d k ∈ Z + , indicating the number of students she is willing to supervise. Similarly each project p j ∈ P has a capacity c j ∈ Z + indicating the maximum number of students that can be assigned to this project.
We assume that for any lecturer l k , max{c j : p j ∈ P k } ≤ d k ≤ {c j : p j ∈ P k } (i.e., the capacity of l k is (i) at least the highest capacity of the projects offered by l k , and (ii) at most the sum of the capacities of all the projects l k is offering). We denote by L j k , the projected preference list of lecturer l k for p j , which can be obtained from L k by removing those students that do not find p j acceptable (thereby retaining the order of the remaining students from L k ).
An assignment M is a subset of S × P such that (s i , p j ) ∈ M implies that s i finds p j acceptable. If (s i , p j ) ∈ M , we say that s i is assigned to p j , and p j is assigned s i . For convenience, if s i is assigned in M to p j , where p j is offered by l k , we may also say that s i is assigned to l k , and l k is assigned s i .
For any student s i ∈ S, we let M (s i ) denote the set of projects assigned to s i in M . For any project p j ∈ P, we denote by M (p j ) the set of students assigned to p j in M . Project p j is undersubscribed, full or oversubscribed according as |M (p j )| is less than, equal to, or greater than c j , respectively. Similarly, for any lecturer l k ∈ L, we denote by M (l k ) the set of students assigned to l k in M . Lecturer l k is undersubscribed, full or oversubscribed according as |M (l k )| is less than, equal to, or greater than d k , respectively.
A matching M is an assignment such that each student is assigned to at most one project in M , each project is assigned at most c j students in M , and each lecturer is assigned at most d k students in M . If s i is assigned to some project in M , for convenience we let M (s i ) denote that project.
In what follows, l k is the lecturer who offers project p j .
Definition 1 (stability).
Let I be an instance of spa-s, and let M be a matching in I . We say M is stable if it admits no blocking pair, where a blocking pair is an acceptable pair (s i , p j ) ∈ (S × P) \ M such that (a) s i is either unassigned in M or prefers p j to M (s i ), and (b) either (i) p j is undersubscribed and l k is undersubscribed, or (ii) p j is undersubscribed, l k is full and either s i ∈ M (l k ), or l k prefers s i to the worst student in M (l k ), or (iii) p j is full and l k prefers s i to the worst student in M (p j ),
To find a stable matching in an instance of SPA-S, two linear-time algorithms were described in [1] . The stable matching produced by the first algorithm is student-optimal (that is, each student has the best-possible project that they could obtain in any stable matching) while the one produced by the second algorithm is lecturer-optimal (that is, each lecturer has the best set of students that they could obtain in any stable matching). The set of student-optimal stable matchings in a given instance of SPA-S satisfy several interesting properties that together form what we will call the Unpopular Projects Theorem (analogous to the Rural Hospitals Theorem for HR [11] ), which we state as follows.
Theorem 1 ([1]
). For a given instance of SPA-S, the following holds.
1. Each lecturer is assigned the same number of students in all stable matchings 2. Exactly the same students are unassigned in all stable matchings 3. A project offered by an undersubscribed lecturer is assigned the same number of students in all stable matchings
Ties in the preference lists
We now define formally the generalisation of SPA-S in which preference lists can include ties. In the preference list of lecturer l k ∈ L, a set T of r students forms a tie of length r if l k does not prefer s i to s i for any s i , s i ∈ T (i.e., l k is indifferent between s i and s i ). A tie in a student's preference list is defined similarly. For convenience, in what follows we consider a non-tied entry in a preference list as a tie of length one. We denote by SPA-ST the generalisation of SPA-S in which the preference list of each student (respectively lecturer) comprises a strict ranking of ties, each comprising one or more projects (respectively students). An example SPA-ST instance I 1 is given in Fig. 1 , which involves the set of students S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 }, the set of projects P = {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 } and the set of lecturers L = {l 1 , l 2 }. Ties in the preference lists are indicated by round brackets.
In the context of SPA-ST, we assume that all notation and terminology carries over from Sect. 2.1 as defined for SPA-S with the exception of stability, which we now define. When ties appear in the preference lists, three levels of stability arise (as in the HRT context [11, 12] ), namely weak stability, strong stability and super-stability. The formal definition for weak stability in SPA-ST follows from the definition for stability in SPA-S (see Definition 1). Moreover, the existence of
Student preferences
Lecturer preferences s1: p1 l1: s5 (s1 s2) s3 s4 l1 offers p1, p2 s2: (p1 p3) l2: s4 s5 s2 l2 offers p3 s3: p2 s4: p2 p3
Project capacities: c1 = c3 = 1, c2 = 2 s5: p3 p1
Lecturer capacities: d1 = 2, d2 = 1 Proof. Let I be an instance of spa-st and let M be a matching in I. Suppose M is weakly stable in I. Let I be an instance of spa-s obtained from I by breaking the ties in the following way. For each student s i in I such that the preference list of s i includes a tie T containing two or more projects, we order the preference list of s i in I as follows: if s i is assigned in M to a project p j in T then s i prefers p j to every other project in T ; otherwise, we order the projects in T arbitrarily. For each lecturer l k in I such that l k 's preference list includes a tie X, if X contains students that are assigned to l k in M and students that are not assigned to l k in M , then l k 's preference list in I is ordered in such a way that each s i in X such that s i ∈ M (l k ) is better than each s i in X such that s i / ∈ M (l k ); otherwise, we order the students in X arbitrarily. Now, suppose (s i , p j ) forms a blocking pair for M in I Given how the ties in I were removed to obtain I , this implies that (s i , p j ) forms a blocking pair for M in I, a contradiction to our assumption that M is weakly stable in I. Thus M is stable in I .
Conversely, suppose M is stable in some instance I of spa-s obtained from I by breaking the ties in some way. Now suppose that M is not weakly stable in I. Then some pair (s i , p j ) forms a blocking pair for M in I. It is then clear from the definition of weak stability and from the construction of I that (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair for M in I , a contradiction.
As mentioned earlier, super-stability is the most robust concept to seek in a practical setting. Only if no super-stable matching exists in the underlying problem instance should other forms of stability be sought. Thus, for the remainder of this paper, we focus on super-stability in the SPA-ST context.
Definition 2 (super-stability).
Let I be an instance of spa-st, and let M be a matching in I. We say M is super-stable if it admits no blocking pair, where a blocking pair is an acceptable pair (s i , p j ) ∈ (S × P) \ M such that (a) either s i is unassigned in M or s i prefers p j to M (s i ) or is indifferent between them; and (b) either (i) p j is undersubscribed and l k is undersubscribed, or (ii) p j is undersubscribed, l k is full, and either s i ∈ M (l k ) or l k prefers s i to the worst student in M (l k ) or is indifferent between them, or (iii) p j is full and l k prefers s i to the worst student in M (p j ) or is indifferent between them, where l k is the lecturer who offers p j . It may be verified that the matching M = {(s 3 , p 2 ), (s 4 , p 3 ), (s 5 , p 1 )} is super-stable in Fig. 1 Since I is an arbitrary spa-s instance obtained from I by breaking the ties in some way, it follows that in I: (i) if s i is assigned in M then s i either prefers p j to M (s i ) or is indifferent between them, (ii) if p j is full in M then l k either prefers s i to a worst student in M (p j ) or is indifferent between them, and (iii) if l k is full in M then either s i ∈ M (l k ) or l k prefers s i to a worst student in M (l k ) or is indifferent between them. This implies that (s i , p j ) forms a blocking pair for M in I, a contradiction to the super-stability of M . Conversely, suppose M is stable in every instance of spa-s obtained from I by breaking the ties in some way. Now suppose M is not super-stable in I. This implies that M admits a blocking pair (s i , p j ) in I. We construct an instance I of spa-s from I by breaking the ties in the following way: (i) if s i is assigned in M and s i is indifferent between p j and M (s i ) in I then s i prefers p j to M (s i ) in I ; otherwise we break the ties in s i 's preference list arbitrarily, and (ii) if some student, say s i , different from s i is assigned to l k in M such that l k is indifferent between s i and s i in I then l k prefers s i to s i in I ; otherwise we break the ties in l k 's preference list arbitrarily. Thus (s i , p j ) forms a blocking pair for M in I , i.e., M is not stable in I , a contradiction to the fact that M is stable in every instance of spa-s obtained from I by breaking the ties in some way.
The following proposition, which is a consequence of Propositions 1 and 2, and Theorem 1, tells us that if a super-stable matching M exists in I then all weakly stable matchings in I are of the same size (equal to the size of M ) and match exactly the same set of students.
Proposition 3. Let I be an instance of SPA-ST, and suppose that I admits a super-stable matching M . Then the Unpopular Lecturers Theorem holds for the set of weakly stable matchings in I.
Cloning from SPA-ST to HRT does not work
A linear-time algorithm for HRT under super-stability was described in [11] . One might assume that reducing a given instance of SPA-ST to an instance of HRT (using a "cloning" technique) and subsequently applying the algorithm described in [11] to the resulting instance would solve our problem. However, this is not always true. In what follows, we describe an obvious method to clone an instance of SPA-ST to an instance of HRT, and we show that applying the super-stable matching algorithm described in [11] to the resulting HRT instance does not work in general.
A method to derive an instance of HRT from an instance of SPA-ST was described by Cooper [8] . We briefly explain this method as follows. The students involved are converted into residents and the projects are converted into hospitals. Residents inherit their preference lists naturally from students. Hospitals inherit their preference lists from the projected preference list of the associated project according to the lecturer offering the project. Each hospital also inherits its capacity from the project. However, in order to translate the lecturer's capacity into the HRT instance, we create n dummy residents for each lecturer l k , where n is the difference between the sum of the capacities of all the projects l k is offering and the capacity of l k . The preference list for each of these dummy residents will be a single tie consisting of all the hospitals associated with the projects offered by l k , and the preference lists for each hospital will include a tie in its first position consisting of all the dummy residents associated with l k .
Clearly, we see that there is a super-stable matching in the SPA-ST instance illustrated in Fig. 2 . However, there is no super-stable matching in the cloned HRT instance illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Students
Lecturers s1: p1 l1: s1 (s2 s3) s2: (p1 p2) l2: s3 s3: p2 p3 Fig. 2 . An instance of SPA-ST. Lecturer l1 has capacity 1 and offers p1 and p2. Lecturer l2 has capacity 1 and offers p3. Each project has capacity 1. We note that this instance admits a super-stable matching M = {(s1, p1), (s3, p3)}.
Residents
Hospitals r0: (h1 h2) h1: r0 r1 r2 r1: h1 h2: r0 (r2 r3) r2: (h1 h2) h3: r3 r3: h2 h3 Fig. 3 . An instance of HRT cloned from the SPA-ST instance illustrated in Fig. 2 . Each hospital has capacity 1. It is clear that the matching M = {(r0, h2), (r1, h1), (r3, h3)} is not superstable, as (r0, h1) forms a blocking pair. Indeed this hrt instance has no superstable matching.
An algorithm for SPA-ST under super-stability
In this section we present our algorithm for SPA-ST under super-stability, which we will refer to as Algorithm SPA-ST-super. First, we note that our algorithm is a non-trivial extension of Algorithm SPA-student for spa-s from [1] and Algorithm HRT-Super-Res for hrt from [11] . Due to the more general setting of SPA-ST, Algorithm SPA-ST-super requires some new ideas, and the proofs of the correctness results are more complex than for the aforementioned algorithms for spa-s and hrt. In Sect. 3.1, we give a description of our algorithm, before presenting it in pseudocode form. In Sect. 3.2, we illustrate an execution of our algorithm with respect to an example SPA-ST instance. We present the algorithm's correctness results in Sect. 3.3. Finally, in Sect. 3.4, we show that the set of super-stable matchings in an instance of SPA-ST satisfy several structural properties.
Description of the algorithm
First, we present some definitions relating to the algorithm. In what follows, I is an instance of SPA-ST, (s i , p j ) is an acceptable pair in I and l k is the lecturer who offers p j . Further, if (s i , p j ) belongs to some super-stable matching in I, we call (s i , p j ) a super-stable pair and s i a super-stable partner of p j (and vice-versa).
During the execution of the algorithm, students become provisionally assigned to projects. It is possible for a project to be provisionally assigned a number of students that exceed its capacity. This holds analogously for a lecturer. The algorithm proceeds by deleting from the preference lists certain (s i , p j ) pairs that cannot be super-stable. By the term delete (s i , p j ), we mean the removal of p j from s i 's preference list and the removal of s i from L j k (the projected preference list of lecturer l k for p j ). In addition, if s i is provisionally assigned to p j at this point, we break the assignment. By the head of a student's preference list at a given point, we mean the set of one or more projects, tied in her preference list after any deletions might have occurred, that she prefers to all other projects in her list.
For project p j , we define the tail of L j k as the least-preferred tie in L j k after any deletions might have occurred (recalling that a tie can be of length one). In the same fashion, we define the tail of L k (preference list of lecturer l k ) as the leastpreferred tie in L k after any deletions might have occurred. If s i is provisionally assigned to p j , we define the successors of s i in L j k as those students that are worse than s i in L j k . An analogous definition holds for the successors of s i in L k . We now describe our algorithm. Algorithm SPA-ST-super begins by initialising an empty set M which will contain the provisional assignments of students to projects (and intuitively to lecturers). We remark that such assignments can subsequently be broken during the algorithm's execution. Also, each project is initially assigned to be empty (i.e., not assigned to any student).
The while loop of the algorithm involves each student s i who is not provisionally assigned to any project in M and who has a non-empty list applying in turn to each project p j at the head of her list. Immediately, s i becomes provisionally assigned to p j in M (and to l k ). If, by gaining a new student, p j becomes oversubscribed, it turns out that none of the students s t at the tail of L j k can be assigned to p j in any super-stable matching -such pairs (s t , p j ) are deleted. Similarly, if by gaining a new student, l k becomes oversubscribed, none of the students s t at the tail of L k can be assigned to any project offered by l k in any super-stable matching -such pairs (s t , p u ), for each project p u ∈ P k that s t finds acceptable, are deleted.
Regardless of whether any deletions occurred as a result of the two conditionals described in the previous paragraph, we have two further (possibly non-disjoint) cases in which deletions may occur. If p j becomes full, we let s r be any worst student provisionally assigned to p j (according to L j k ), and we delete (s t , p j ) for each successor s t of s r in L j k . Similarly if l k becomes full, we let s r be any worst student provisionally assigned to l k , and we delete (s t , p u ), for each successor s t of s r in L k and for each project p u ∈ P k that s t finds acceptable. As we will prove later, none of the (student, project) pairs deleted when a project or a lecturer becomes full can be a super-stable pair.
At the point where the while loop terminates (i.e., when every student is provisionally assigned to one or more projects or has an empty list), if some project p j that was previously full ends up undersubscribed, we let s r be any one of the most preferred students (according to L j k ) who was provisionally assigned to p j during some iteration of the algorithm but is not assigned to p j at this point (for convenience, we henceforth refer to such s r as the most preferred student rejected from p j according to L j k ). If the students at the tail of L k (recalling that the tail of L k is the least-preferred tie in L k after any deletions might have occurred) are no better than s r , it turns out that none of these students s t can be assigned to any project offered by l k in any super-stable matching -such pairs (s t , p u ), for each project p u ∈ P k that s t finds acceptable, are deleted. The while loop is then potentially reactivated, and the entire process continues until every student is provisionally assigned to a project or has an empty list.
At the termination of the repeat-until loop, if the set M , containing the provisional assignments of students to projects, is super-stable relative to the given instance I then M is output as a super-stable matching in I. Otherwise, the algorithm reports that no super-stable matching exists in I. We present Algorithm SPA-ST-super in pseudocode form in Algorithm 1.
Example algorithm execution
We illustrate an execution of Algorithm SPA-ST-super with respect to the SPA-ST instance shown in Fig. 1 on Page 6. We initialise M = {}, which will contain the provisional assignment of students to projects. For each project p j ∈ P, we set full(p j ) = false (full(p j ) will be set to true when p j becomes full; thus we can easily identify any project which was full during an iteration of the algorithm and ended up undersubscribed). We assume that the students become provisionally assigned to each project at the head of their list in subscript order. Table 1 illustrates how this execution of Algorithm SPA-ST-super proceeds with respect to I 1 . while some student si is unassigned and has a non-empty list do 6:
for each project pj at the head of si's list do 7:
l k ← lecturer who offers pj 8:
/* si applies to pj */ 9:
M ← M ∪ {(si, pj)} / *provisionally assign si to pj (and to l k ) */ 10:
if pj is oversubscribed then 11:
for each student st at the tail of L j k do 12:
delete (st, pj) 13:
else if l k is oversubscribed then 14:
for each student st at the tail of L k do 15:
for each project pu ∈ P k ∩ At do 16: delete (st, pu) 17:
if pj is full then 18:
full(pj) = true 19:
sr ← worst student assigned to pj according to L j k {any if > 1} 20:
for each successor st of sr on L j k do 21:
delete (st, pj) 22:
if l k is full then 23:
sr ← worst student assigned to l k according to L k {any if > 1} 24:
for each successor st of sr on L k do 25:
for each project pu ∈ P k ∩ At do 26: delete (st, pu) 27:
if some project pj is undersubscribed and full(pj) is true then 28:
l k ← lecturer who offers pj 29:
sr ← most preferred student rejected from pj according to L j k {any if > 1} 30:
if the students at the tail of L k are no better than sr then 31:
for each student st at the tail of L k do 32:
for each project pu ∈ P k ∩ At do 33:
delete (st, pu) 34: until every unassigned student has an empty list 35: if M is a super-stable matching in I then 36:
return M 37: else 38:
return "no super-stable matching exists in I" Table 1 . An execution of Algorithm SPA-ST-super with respect to Fig. 1 .
while loop iterations
Student applies to project
The tail of L 1 1 contains s1 and s2 -thus we delete the pairs (s1, p1) and (s2, p1) (and intuitively, we break the provisional assignments).
The tail of L 3 2 contains only s2 -thus we delete the pair (s2, p3) (and intuitively, we break the provisional assignment).
The first iteration of the while loop terminates since every unassigned student (that is, s1 and s2) has an empty list. Now, at this point full(p1) is true and p1 is undersubscribed. Moreover, the student at the tail of L1 (that is, s4) is no better than s1, where s1 is the most preferred student rejected from p1 according to L 1 1 ; thus we delete the pair (s4, p2). The while loop is then reactivated.
The tail of L 3 2 contains only s5 -thus we delete the pair (s5, p3).
Again, every unassigned students has an empty list. We also have that full(p2) is true and p2 is undersubscribed; however no further deletion is carried out in line 33 of the algorithm, since the student at the tail of L1 (that is, s3) is better than s4, where s4 is the most preferred student rejected from p2 according to L 2 1 . Hence, the repeat-until loop terminates and the algorithm outputs M = {(s3, p2), (s4, p3), (s5, p1)} as a superstable matching. It is clear that M is super-stable in the original instance I1.
Correctness of Algorithm SPA-ST-super
We now present the following results regarding the correctness of Algorithm SPA-ST-super. The first of these results deals with the fact that no super-stable pair is ever deleted during the execution of the algorithm. In what follows, I is an instance of SPA-ST, (s i , p j ) is an acceptable pair in I and l k is the lecturer who offers p j . Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that the first super-stable pair to be deleted within the while loop during an arbitrary execution E of the algorithm is (s i , p j ), which belongs to some super-stable matching, say M * . Let l k be the lecturer who offers p j . Suppose that M is the assignment immediately after the deletion. Let us denote this point in the algorithm where the deletion is made by ‡. During E, there are four cases that would lead to the deletion of any (student, project) pair within the while loop. In what follows, we consider each case.
is deleted because some student (possibly s i ) became provisionally assigned to p j during E, causing p j to become oversubscribed. If p j is full or undersubscribed at point ‡, since s i ∈ M * (p j ) \ M (p j ) and no project can be oversubscribed in M * , then there is some student s r ∈ M (p j ) \ M * (p j ) such that l k either prefers s r to s i or is indifferent between them. We note that s r cannot be assigned to a project that she prefers to p j in any super-stable matching as this would mean a super-stable pair must have been deleted before (s i , p j ), as p j must be in the head of s r 's list when she applied. Thus either s r is unassigned in M * , or s r prefers p j to M * (s r ) or is indifferent between them. Clearly, for any combination of l k and p j being full or undersubscribed in M * , it follows that (s r , p j ) blocks M * , a contradiction.
is deleted because some student (possibly s i ) became provisionally assigned to a project offered by lecturer l k during E, causing l k to become oversubscribed. At point ‡, none of the projects offered by l k is oversubscribed in M , otherwise we will be in Case 1. Similar to Case 1, if l k is full or undersubscribed at point ‡, since s i ∈ M * (p j )\M (p j ) and no lecturer can be oversubscribed in M * , it follows that there is some project p j ∈ P k and some student s r ∈ M (p j ) \ M * (p j ). We consider two subcases.
(i) If p j = p j , then s r = s i . Moreover, as in Case 1, either s r is unassigned in M * , or s r prefers p j to M * (s r ) or is indifferent between them. For any combination of l k and p j being full or undersubscribed in M * , since l k prefers s r to s i or is indifferent between them, it follows that (s r , p j ) blocks M * , a contradiction. (ii) If p j = p j . Assume firstly that s r = s i . Then as p j has fewer assignees in M * than it has provisional assignees in M and as in (i) above, (s r , p j ) blocks M * , a contradiction. Finally assume s r = s i . Then s i must have applied to p j at some point during E before ‡. Clearly, s i prefers p j to p j or is indifferent between them, since p j must have been in the head of s i 's list when s i applied. Since s i ∈ M * (l k ) and p j is undersubscribed in M * , we have that (s i , p j ) blocks M * , a contradiction.
Thus at least one of the students in M (p j ), say s r will not be assigned p j in M * , for otherwise p j will be oversubscribed in M * . This implies that either s r is unassigned in M * , or s r prefers p j to M * (s r ) or is indifferent between them. For otherwise we obtain a contradiction to (s i , p j ) being the first super-stable pair to be deleted. Since l k prefers s r to s i , it follows that (s r , p j ) blocks M * , a contradiction.
Case 4l k is full. Suppose that (s i , p j ) is deleted because l k became full during E. We consider two subcases.
(i) All the students assigned to p j in M at point ‡ (if any) are also assigned to p j in M * . This implies that p j has one more assignee in M * than it has provisional assignees in M , namely s i . Thus, some other project p j ∈ P k has fewer assignees in M * than it has provisional assignees in M , for otherwise l k would be oversubscribed in M * . Hence there exists some student s r ∈ M (p j ) \ M * (p j ). It is clear that s r = s i since s i plays the role of s t in line 32 of the algorithm at some for loop iteration. Also, s r cannot be assigned to a project that she prefers to p j in M * , as explained in Case 1. Hence, since p j is undersubscribed in M * and l k prefers s r to s i , (s r , p j ) blocks M * , a contradiction. (ii) Some student, say s r , assigned to p j in M is not assigned p j in M * , that is, s r ∈ M (p j ) \ M * (p j ). Since s r cannot be assigned a project that she prefers to p j in M * and l k prefers s r to s i , this implies (s r , p j ) blocks M * , a contradiction. Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that the first super-stable pair to be deleted during an aribitrary execution E of the algorithm is (s i , p j ), which belongs to some super-stable matching, say M * . Then by Lemma 2, (s i , p j ) was deleted outside of the while loop during E. Let l k be the lecturer who offers p j . Suppose that M is the assignment immediately after the termination of the most recent while loop. Let p j be some other project offered by l k which was full during an iteration of the while loop and subsequently ends up undersubscribed at the end of the while loop, that is p j plays the role of p j in line 27. Suppose that s i plays the role of s r in line 29, that is s i was the most preferred student rejected from p j according to L j k (possibly s i = s i ). Then l k prefers s i to s i or is indifferent between them, since s i plays the role of s t at some for loop iteration in line 31. Moreover s i was provisionally assigned to p j during an iteration of the while loop but (s i , p j ) / ∈ M at the end of the while loop. Thus (s i , p j ) / ∈ M * , since no super-stable pair is deleted within the while loop, as proved in Lemma 2.
Again, none of the students assigned to some project in M can be assigned any project better than their provisional project in any super-stable matching as this would mean a super-stable pair must have been deleted before (s i , p j ), as each student apply to projects in the head of their list. So, either s i is unassigned in M * or s i prefers p j to M * (s i ) or is indifferent between them. By the superstability of M * , p j is full in M * and l k prefers the worst student in M * (p j ) to s i , for if p j is undersubscribed in M * then (s i , p j ) blocks M * since l k prefers s i to s i or is indifferent between them, a contradiction.
Let l z0 = l k , p t0 = p j and s q0 = s i . Just before the deletion of (s i , p j ) occurred, p t0 is undersubscribed in M . Since p t0 is full in M * , it follows that there exists some student s q1 ∈ M * (p t0 ) \ M (p t0 ). We note that l z0 prefers s q1 to s q0 . Since (s i , p j ) is the first super-stable pair to be deleted, s q1 is assigned in M a project p t1 such that s q1 prefers p t1 to p t0 or is indifferent between them. For otherwise, as students apply to projects in the head of their list, that would mean (s q1 , p t0 ) must have been deleted during an iteration of the while loop, a contradiction. We note that p t1 = p t0 , since s q1 ∈ M (p t1 ) and s q1 / ∈ M (p t0 ). Let l z1 be the lecturer who offers p t1 . By the super-stability of M * , it follows that either (a) p t1 is full in M * and l z1 prefers a worst student in M * (p t1 ) to s q1 , or (b) p t1 is undersubscribed in M * , l z1 is full in M * , s q1 / ∈ M * (l z1 ) and l z1 prefers a worst student in M * (l z1 ) to s q1 .
Otherwise, (s q1 , p t1 ) blocks M * . In case (a), there exists some student s q2 ∈ M * (p t1 ) \ M (p t1 ). Let p t2 = p t1 . In case (b), there exists some student s q2 ∈ M * (l z1 ) \ M (l z1 ). We note that l z1 prefers s q2 to s q1 , clearly s q2 = s q1 . We suppose M * (s q2 ) = p t2 (possibly p t2 = p t1 ). Applying similar reasoning as for s q1 , s q2 is assigned in M a project p t3 such that s q2 prefers p t3 to p t2 or is indifferent between them. Let l z2 be the lecturer who offers p t3 .
We are identifying a sequence s qi i≥0 of students, a sequence p ti i≥0 of projects, and a sequence l zi i≥0 of lecturers, such that, for each i ≥ 1 1. s qi prefers p t2i−1 to p t2i−2 or is indifferent between them. 2. (s qi , p t2i−1 ) ∈ M and (s qi , p t2i−2 ) ∈ M * . 3. l z0 offer p t0 . l zi offers both p t2i−1 and p t2i (possibly p t2i−1 = p t2i ) 4. l zi prefers s qi+1 to s qi .
First we claim that for each new project we identify, p t2i−1 = p t2i−2 for i ≥ 1. Suppose p t2i−1 = p t2i−2 for some i ≥ 1. From above s qi was identified by l zi−1 such that (s qi , p t2i−2 ) ∈ M * \ M . Moreover (s qi , p t2i−1 ) ∈ M . Hence we reach a contradiction. Clearly, for each student s qi for i ≥ 1 we identify, s qi must be assigned to distinct projects in M and M * .
Next we claim that for each new student s qi we identify, s qi = s qt for 1 ≤ t < i. We prove this by induction on i. For the base case, clearly s q2 = s q1 . We assume that the claim holds for some i ≥ 1, i.e., the sequence s q1 , s q2 , . . . , s qi are distinct. We show that the claim holds for i+1, i.e, for the sequence s q1 , s q2 , . . . , s qi , s qi+1 , we have that s qi+1 = s qj for 1 ≤ j ≤ i. Clearly s qi+1 = s qi since l zi prefers s qi+1 to s qi , thus 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1. Now, suppose s qi+1 = s qj for 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1. This implies that s qj was identified by l zi and clearly l zi prefers s qj to s qj−1 . Now since s qi+1 was identified by l zi , it follows that either (i) p t2i−1 is full in M * , or (ii) p t2i−1 is undersubscribed in M * and l zi is full in M * . We consider each cases further as follows. Since s qi = s qj−1 and l zi is full in M * , l zi should have been able to identify distinct students s qj and s qi+1 corresponding to students s qj−1 and s qi respectively, a contradiction.
This completes the induction step. As the sequence of distinct students and projects is finite, we reach an immediate contradiction.
Lemmas 2 and 3 immediately give rise to Lemma 1. The next three lemmas deal with the case that Algorithm SPA-ST-super reports the non-existence of a super-stable matching in I.
Lemma 4.
If any student is multiply assigned at the termination of Algorithm SPA-ST-super, then I admits no super-stable matching.
Proof. Let M be the assignment at the termination of the algorithm. Suppose for a contradiction that there exists a super-stable matching M * in I. First, we claim that the occupancy of some lecturer in M * is strictly less than her occupancy in M . Suppose not, then
If any student s i is unassigned in M , then by Lemma 1, s i is not asssigned a project in any super-stable matching; thus s i is unassigned in M * . Equivalently, if s i is assigned in M * , then s i is assigned in M . Let S 1 denote the students who are provisionally assigned to at least one project in M , and let S 2 denote the students who are assigned to a project in M * ; it follows that |S 2 | ≤ |S 1 |. Hence,
since some student in S 1 is multiply assigned in M . Inequality (2) contradicts inequality (1) . Hence, our claim is established. As the occupancy of some lecturer l k in M * is less than her occupancy in M , l k is undersubscribed in M * , since no lecturer is oversubscribed in M . In particular there is some project p j offered by l k and some student s i such that p j is undersubscribed in M * and s i ∈ M (p j ) \ M * (p j ). Since (s i , p j ) ∈ M , then p j must have been in the head of s i 's preference list when s i applied to p j during the algorithm's execution. Also, since Lemma 1 guarantees that no super-stable pair is ever deleted during an execution of the algorithm, s i cannot be assigned any project she prefers to p j in M * . Hence (s i , p j ) blocks M * , a contradiction. Proof. Let M be the assignment at the termination of the algorithm. Suppose for a contradiction that there exists a super-stable matching M * in I. Let S 1 and S 2 be as defined in the proof of Lemma 4. We claim that if any lecturer l k is undersubscribed in M * , then every student provisionally assigned to l k in M is also assigned to l k in M * . Suppose not, then there exists a student s i assigned to l k in M but not in M * . Let p j be any project offered by l k such that s i ∈ M (p j ) \ M * (p j ). By Lemma 1, s i cannot be assigned to a project that she prefers to p j in M * . Also, by the super-stability of M * , p j is full in M * and l k prefers a worst student in M * (p j ) to s i . Let l z1 = l k , p t1 = p j and s q1 = s i . As p t1 is full in M * and no project is oversubscribed in M , there exists some student s q2 ∈ M * (p t1 ) \ M (p t1 ). We assume s q2 is a worst student in M * (p t1 ) (recall that l z1 prefers s q2 to s q1 ). By Lemma 1, s q2 is assigned in M a project p t2 which she prefers to p t1 . We note that s q2 cannot be indifferent between p t1 and p t2 , for upon termination of the algorithm, no student is multiply assigned in M . Thus (s q2 , p t1 ) would have been deleted during the algorithm's execution, as each student assigned to a project in M applied to all the projects in the head of their list, contradicting Lemma 1. It follows that s q2 ∈ M (p t2 ) \ M * (p t2 ). Let l z2 be the lecturer who offers p t2 . By the super-stability of M * , it follows that either (a) p t2 is full in M * and l z2 prefers a worst student in M * (p t2 ) to s q2 , or (b) p t2 is undersubscribed in M * , l z2 is full in M * , s q2 / ∈ M * (l z2 ) and l z2 prefers a worst student in M * (l z2 ) to s q2 .
Otherwise (s q2 , p t2 ) blocks M * . In case (a), there exists some student s q3 ∈ M * (p t2 ) \ M (p t2 ). Let p t3 = p t2 . In case (b), there exists some student s q3 ∈ M * (l z2 ) \ M (l z2 ). We note that l z2 prefers s q3 to s q2 . We suppose M * (s q3 ) = p t3 (possibly p t3 = p t2 ). It is clear that s q3 = s q2 . Applying similar reasoning as for s q2 , s q3 is assigned in M a project p t4 which she prefers to p t3 . Let l z3 be the lecturer who offers p t4 .
As in the proof of Lemma 3, we are identifying a sequence s q1 , s q2 , s q3 , . . . of students, sequence p t1 , p t2 , p t3 , . . . of projects and sequence l z1 , l z2 , l z3 , . . . of lecturers, such that for each i ≥ 1 (i) s qi+1 prefers p t2i to p t2i−1 , (ii) l z1 offers p t1 and l zi+1 offers both p t2i and p t2i+1 (possibly p t2i+1 = p t2i ), (iii) l zi prefers s qi+1 to s qi .
Moreover for each new student s qr that we identify in the sequence s q1 , s q2 , s q3 , . . ., it follows by a similar argument to the one given in the proof of Lemma 3 that s qr = s qt for 2 ≤ t < r. Since we have a finite number of students in an instance of SPA-ST, we reach a contradiction. Hence we have established our claim that if a lecturer l k is undersubscribed in M * , every student provisionally assigned to l k in M is also assigned to l k in M * .
Secondly, we claim that if any lecturer l k is undersubscribed in M , then l k has the same number of provisional assignees in M as it has assignees in M * . For by the first claim, any lecturer that is full in M is also full in M * , and any lecturer that is undersubscribed in M has as many assignees in M * as it has in M . Hence |M (l k )| ≤ |M * (l k )| for each l k ∈ L. As proved in Lemma 4, we also have that
since no student is multiply assigned in M . Hence |M (l k )| = |M * (l k )| for each l k ∈ L. Now let l k be the lecturer who became full during some execution of the algorithm and subsequently ends up undersubscribed in M . At the point in the algorithm where l k became full (line 23), we note that none of the projects offered by l k is oversubscribed. Since l k ended up undersubscribed in M , it follows that there is some project p j ∈ P k that has fewer assignees in M at the termination of the algorithm than it had at some point during the algorithm's execution, thus p j is undersubscribed in M . Moreover l k undersubscribed in M implies that l k is undersubscribed in M * by the second claim.
Further, we claim that each project offered by l k has the same number of assignees in M * as it has provisional assignees in M . For suppose not, then there is some project p t ∈ P k such that |M * (p t )| < |M (p t )|; thus p t is undersubscribed in M * , since no project is oversubscribed in M . It follows that there exists s r ∈ M (p t ) \ M * (p t ) such that s r is unassigned in M * or prefers p t to M * (s r ), by Lemma 1.
Since l k is undersubscribed in M * , (s r , p t ) blocks M * , a contradiction. Therefore |M * (p t )| ≥ |M (p t )|. Moreover, since |M (l k )| = |M * (l k )|, we have that |M (p t )| = |M * (p t )| for all p t ∈ P k .
Hence p j undersubscribed in M implies that p j is undersubscribed in M * . Moreover, there is some student s i who was provisionally assigned to p j at some point during the execution of the algorithm but is not assigned to p j in M . Thus, the pair (s i , p j ) was deleted during the algorithm's execution, so that (s i , p j ) / ∈ M * by Lemma 1. It follows that either s i is unassigned in M * or s i prefers p j to M * (s i ). Hence, (s i , p j ) blocks M * , a contradiction. Lemma 6. If the pair (s i , p j ) was deleted during some execution of Algorithm SPA-ST-super, and at the termination of the algorithm s i is not assigned to a project better than p j , and each of p j and l k is undersubscribed, then I admits no super-stable matching.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that there exists a super-stable matching M * in I. Let (s i , p j ) be a pair that was deleted during an arbitrary execution E of the algorithm. This implies that (s i , p j ) / ∈ M * by Lemma 1. Let M be the assignment at the termination of E. By the hypothesis of the lemma, l k is undersubscribed in M . This implies that l k is undersubscribed in M * , as proved in Lemma 5. Since p j is offered by l k , and p j is undersubscribed in M , it follows from the proof of Lemma 5 that p j is undersubscribed in M * . Further, by the hypothesis of the lemma, either s i is unassigned in M , or s i prefers p j to M (s i ) or is indifferent between them. By Lemma 1, this is true for s i in M * . Hence (s i , p j ) blocks M * , a contradiction.
The next lemma shows that the final assignment may be used to determine the existence, or otherwise, of a super-stable matching in I.
Lemma 7. If at the termination of Algorithm SPA-ST-super, the assignment M is not super-stable in I, then no super-stable matching exists in I.
Proof. Suppose M is not super-stable in I. If some student s i is multiply assigned in M , then I admits no super-stable matching, by Lemma 4. Hence suppose no student is multiply assigned in M . Then M is a matching, since no project or lecturer is oversubscribed in M . Let (s i , p j ) be a blocking pair of M in I, then s i is either unassigned in M or prefers p j to M (s i ) or is indifferent between them. Whichever of these is the case, (s i , p j ) has been deleted and therefore does not belong to any super-stable matching, by Lemma 1. Let l k be the lecturer who offers p j . If (s i , p j ) was deleted as a result of l k being full or oversubscribed, (s i , p j ) could only block M if l k ends up undersubscribed in M . If this is the case, then I admits no super-stable matching, by Lemma 5. Now suppose (s i , p j ) was deleted as a result of p j being full or oversubscribed. Suppose firstly that p j ends up full in M . Then (s i , p j ) cannot block M irrespective of whether l k is undersubscribed or full in M , since l k prefers the worst assigned student(s) in M (p j ) to s i . Hence suppose p j ended up undersubscribed in M . As p j was previously full, each pair (s t , p u ), for each s t that is no better than s i at the tail of L k and each p u ∈ P k ∩ A t , would have been deleted in line 33 of the algorithm. Thus if l k is full in M , then (s i , p j ) does not block M . Suppose l k is undersubscribed in M . If l k was full at some point during the execution of the algorithm, then I admits no super-stable matching, by Lemma 5. Suppose l k was never full during the algorithm's execution. As (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair of M , s i cannot be assigned in M a project that she prefers to p j . Hence I admits no super-stable matching, by Lemma 6.
Finally suppose (s i , p j ) was deleted (at line 33) because some other project p j offered by l k was previously full and ended up undersubscribed at line 27. Then l k must have identified her most preferred student, say s r , rejected from p j such that s i is at the tail of L k and s i is no better than s r in L k . Moreover, every project offered by l k that s i finds acceptable would have been deleted from s i 's preference list at the for loop iteration in line 33. If p j ends up full in M , then (s i , p j ) does not block M . Suppose p j ends up undersubscribed in M . If l k is full in M , then (s i , p j ) does not block M , since s i / ∈ M (l k ) and l k prefers the worst student in M (l k ) to s i . Suppose l k is undersubscribed in M , again by Lemma 6, I admits no super-stable matching.
Lemma 1 shows that there is an optimality property for each assigned student in any super-stable matching found by the algorithm, whilst Lemma 7 establishes the correctness of Algorithm SPA-ST-super. The next lemma shows that Algorithm SPA-ST-super may be implemented to run in linear time.
Lemma 8. Algorithm SPA-ST-super may be implemented to run in O(L) time
and O(n 1 n 2 ) space, where n 1 , n 2 , and L are the number of students, number of projects, and the total length of the preference lists, respectively, in I.
Proof. The algorithm's time complexity depends on how efficiently we can execute the operation of a student applying to a project and the operation of deleting a (student, project) pair, each of which occur once for any (student, project) pair. It turns out that both operations can be implemented to run in constant time, giving Algorithm SPA-ST-super an overall complexity of Θ(L), where L is the total length of all the preference lists. In what follows, we describe the non-trivial aspects of such an implementation. We remark that the data structures discussed here are inspired by, and extend, those detailed in [1, Section 3.3] for Algorithm SPA-student.
For each student s i , build an array position si , where position si (p j ) is the position of project p j in s i 's preference list. For example, if s i 's preference list is (p 2 p 5 p 3 ) p 7 (p 6 p 1 ) then position si (p 5 ) = 2 and position si (p 1 ) = 6. In general, position captures the order in which the projects appear in the preference list when read from left to right, ignoring any ties. Represent s i 's preference list by embedding doubly linked lists in an array preference si . For each project p j ∈ A i , preference si (position si (p j )) stores the list node containing p j . This node contains two next pointers (and two previous pointers) -one to the next project in s i 's list (after deletions, this project may not be located at the next array position), and another pointer to the next project p j in s i 's list, where p j and p j are both offered by the same lecturer. Construct the latter list by traversing through s i 's preference list, using a temporary array to record the last project in the list offered by each lecturer. Use virtual initialisation (described in [4, p. 149]) for these arrays, since the overall O(n 1 n 3 ) initialisation may be too expensive.
To represent the ties in s i 's preference list, build an array successor si . For each project p j in s i 's preference list, successor si (position si (p j )) stores the true boolean if p j is tied with its successor in A i and false otherwise. After the deletion of any (student, project) pair, update the successor booleans as follows: With respect to s i 's preference list given in the previous paragraph, successor si is the array [true, true, false, false, true, false]. Now, suppose p 3 was deleted from s i 's preference list, since successor si (position si (p 3 )) is false and successor si (position si (p 5 )) is true (where p 5 is the predecessor of p 3 ), set successor si (position si (p 5 )) to false. Clearly using these data structures, we can find the next project at the head of each student's preference list, find the next project offered by a given lecturer on each student's preference list, as well as delete a project from a given student's preference list in constant time.
For each lecturer l k , build two arrays preference l k and successor l k , where preference l k (s i ) is the position of student s i in l k 's preference list, and successor l k (preference l k (s i )) stores the position of the first strict successor (with respect to position) of s i in L k or a null value if s i has no strict successor 1 . Represent l k 's preference list L k by the array preference l k , with an additional pointer, last l k . Initially, last l k stores the index of the last position in preference l k . To represent the ties in l k 's preference list, build an array predecessor l k . For each s i ∈ L k , predecessor l k (preference l k (s i )) stores the true boolean if s i is tied with its predecessor in L k and false otherwise.
When l k becomes full, make last l k equivalent to l k 's worst assigned student through the following method. Perform a backward traversal through the array preference l k , starting at last l k , and continuing until l k 's worst assigned student, say s i , is encountered (each student stores a pointer to their assigned project, or a special null value if unassigned). Deletions must be carried out in the preference list of each student who is worse than s i on l k 's preference list (precisely those students whose position in preference l k is greater than or equal to that stored in successor l k (preference l k (s i ))) 2 .
When l k becomes oversubscribed, we can find and delete the students at the tail of l k by performing a backward traversal through the array preference l k , starting at last l k , and continuing until we encounter a student, say s i , such that predecessor l k (preference l k (s i )) stores the false boolean. If l k becomes undersubscribed after we break the assignment of students encountered on this traversal (including s i ) to l k , rather than update last l k immediately, which could be expensive, we wait until l k becomes full again. The cost of these traversals taken over the algorithm's execution is thus linear in the length of l k 's preference list.
For each project p j offered by l k , build the arrays preference pj , successor pj and predecessor pj corresponding to L j k , as described in the previous paragraph for L k . Represent p j 's preference list L j k by the array preference pj , with an additional pointer, last pj . These project preference arrays are used in much the same way as the lecturer preference arrays Since we only visit a student at most twice during these backward traversals, once for the lecturer and once for the project, the asymptotic running time remains linear.
The following theorem collects together Lemmas 1, 7 and 8.
Theorem 2. For a given instance I of SPA-ST, Algorithm SPA-ST-super determines, in O(L) time and O(n 1 n 2 ) space, whether or not a super-stable matching exists in I. If such a matching does exist, all possible executions of the algorithm find one in which each assigned student is assigned to the best project that she could obtain in any super-stable matching, and each unassigned student is unassigned in all super-stable matchings.
Given the optimality property established by Theorem 2, we define the superstable matching found by Algorithm SPA-ST-super to be student-optimal. For example, in the SPA-ST instance illustrated in Fig. 1 , the student-optimal superstable matching is {(s 3 , p 2 ), (s 4 , p 3 ), (s 5 , p 1 )}.
Properties of super-stable matchings in SPA-ST
In this section, we consider properties of the set of super-stable matchings in an instance of SPA-ST. To achieve this, we show that the Unpopular Projects Theorem for SPA-S (see Theorem 1) holds for SPA-ST under super-stability. 
Student preferences
Lecturer preferences s1: p1 l1: s5 s6 s4 (s1 s2) s3 l1 offers p1, p2 s2: (p1 p3) l2: s3 s4 s5 s6 s2 l2 offers p3, p4 s3: p2 p3 s4: p2 p3 s5: p3 p2
Project capacities: c1 = c4 = 1, c2 = c3 = 2 s6: p2 p4
Lecturer capacities: d1 = 2, d2 = 3 
Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate an implementation of Algorithm SPA-ST-super. We implemented our algorithm in Python 3 , and performed our experiments on a system with dual Intel Xeon CPU E5-2640 processors with 64GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 14.04. For our experiment, we were primarily concerned with the following question: how does the nature of the preference lists in a given SPA-ST instance affect the existence of a super-stable matching?
Datasets
For datasets, there are clearly several parameters that can be varied, such as the number of students, projects and lecturers; the lengths of the students' preference lists as well as a measure of the density of ties present in the preference lists. We denote by t d , the measure of the density of ties present in the preference lists. In each student's preference list, the tie density t ds (0 ≤ t ds ≤ 1) is the probability that some project is tied to its successor. The tie density t d l in each lecturer's preference list is defined similarly. At t ds = t d l = 1, each preference lists would be contained in a single tie while at t ds = t d l = 0, no tie would exist in the preference lists, thus reducing the problem to an instance of SPA.
Experimental Setup
For each range of values for the aforementioned parameters, we randomly-generated a set of SPA-ST instances, involving n 1 students (which we will henceforth refer to as the size of the instance), 0.5n 1 projects, 0.2n 1 lecturers and 1.5n 1 total project capacity which was randomly distributed amongst the projects. The capacity for each lecturer l k was chosen randomly to lie between the highest capacity of the projects offered by l k and the sum of the capacities of the projects that l k offers. In each set, we measured the proportion of instances that admit a super-stable matching. It is worth mentioning that when we varied the tie density on both the students' and lecturers' preference lists between 0.1 and 0.5, super-stable matchings were very elusive, even with an instance size of 100 students. Thus, for the purpose of our experiment, we decided to choose a low tie density. For correctness testing of our implementation, we implemented an Integer Programming (IP) model for super-stability in SPA-ST (see Appendix A) using the Gurobi optimisation solver in Python 3 . By generating 10, 000 instances of size 100, we verified consistency between the outcomes of Algorithm SPA-ST-super and the IP-based algorithm in terms of the existence or otherwise of a super-stable matching.
Experiment 1
In the first experiment, we increased the number of students n 1 while maintaining a constant ratio of projects, lecturers, project capacities and lecturer capacities as described above. For various values of n 1 (100 ≤ n 1 ≤ 1000) in increments of 100, we created 1000 randomly-generated instances. The length of each student's preference list was fixed at 50. For all the preference lists, we set t ds = t d l = 0.005 (on average, 1 out of 5 students has a single tie of length 2 in their preference list, and this holds similarly for the lecturers). The result displayed in Fig. 5 shows that the proportion of instances that admit a super-stable matching decreases as the number of students increases.
Experiment 2
In our second experiment, we varied the length of each student's preference list while maintaining the number of students, projects, lecturers, project capacities and lecturer capacities, and tie density in the students' and lecturers' preference lists, as in Experiment 1. For various values of n 1 (100 ≤ n 1 ≤ 1000) in increments of 100, we created 1000 randomly-generated instances.
In the first part of this experiment, the length of each student's preference list was set to 10, and in the second part, the length of each student's preference list was chosen randomly to lie between 0.25n 1 and 0.5n 1 . The result is displayed in Fig. 6 . Although this result shows that more instances admitted a super-stable matching when the preference list was longer compared to when the preference list was fixed at 10, but this difference is not very significant.
Experiment 3
In our last experiment, we investigated how the variation in tie density in both the students' and lecturers' preference lists affects the existence of a super-stable matching. To achieve this, we varied the tie density in the students' preference lists t ds (0 ≤ t d ≤ 0.05) and the tie density in the lecturers' preference lists t d l (0 ≤ t d ≤ 0.05), both in increments of 0.005. For each pair of tie densities in t ds × t d l we randomly-generated 1000 SPA-ST instances for various values of n 1 (100 ≤ n 1 ≤ 1000) in increments of 100. For each of these instances, we maintained the same ratio of projects, lecturers, project capacities and lecturer capacities as in Experiment 1. We also fixed the length of each student's preference list at 50. The result displayed in Fig. 7 shows that increasing the tie density in both the students' and lecturers' preference lists reduces the proportion of instances that admit a super-stable matching. In fact, this proportion reduces further as the size of the instance increases. However, it was interesting to see that when we fixed the tie density in the students' preference lists at 0 and varied the tie density in the lecturers' preference lists, about 75% of the randomly-generated SPA-ST instances involving 1000 students admitted a super-stable matching. Proportion of instances that admit a super-stable matching as the size of the instance increases while varying the length of the preference lists with tie density fixed at 0.005 in both the students' and lecturers' preference lists. Fig. 7 . Each of the coloured square boxes represent the proportion of the 1000 randomly-generated SPA-ST instances that admits a super-stable matching, with respect to the tie density in the students' and lecturers' preference lists. See the colour bar transition, as this proportion ranges from dark (100%) to light (0%).
Discussions and Concluding Remarks
Based on the instances we generated randomly, the experimental results suggest that as we increase the size of the instance and the density of ties in the preference lists, the likelihood of a super-stable matching existing decreases. There was no significant uplift in this likelihood even as we increased the lengths of the students' preference lists. Moreover, when the ties occur only in the lecturers' preference lists, we found that a significantly higher proportion of instances admit a super-stable matching. Given that there are typically more students than lecturers in practical applications, it could be that only lecturers are permitted to have some form of indifference over the students that they find acceptable, whilst each student might be able to provide a strict ordering over what may be a small number of projects that she finds acceptable. On the other hand we did not find the same uplift for the case where ties belong to the students' preference lists only. Further evaluation of our algorithm could investigate how other parameters (e.g., the popularity of some projects, or the position of the ties in the preference lists) affect the existence of a super-stable matching. It would also be interesting to examine the existence of super-stable matchings in real SPA-ST datasets. From a theoretical perspective, an interesting question would be: what is the probability of a super-stable matching existing, given an arbitrary SPA-ST instance? This question has been explored for the Stable Roommates problem (a non-bipartite generalisation of the Stable Marriage problem) [21] .
To cope with the possible non-existence of a super-stable matching, a natural strategy would be to seek a strongly stable matching if one exists, and if not, settle for a weakly stable matching. As noted in Section 1, every instance of SPA-ST admits a weakly stable matching. We leave open the problem of constructing an algorithm for SPA-ST under the strong stability criterion.
Intuitively, θ i,j = 1 if and only if s i is unassigned in M or prefers p j to M (s i ) or is indifferent between them. Let α j be a binary variable in J that corresponds to the occupancy of p j in M . If p j is undersubscribed in M then α j = 1, otherwise α j is not constrained. We enforce this condition by imposing the following constraint:
where n1 i =1
x i ,j = |M (p j )|. Next, we create a binary variable β k in J that corresponds to the occupancy of l k in M . If l k is undersubscribed in M then β k = 1 in S, otherwise β k is not constrained. We enforce this condition by imposing the following constraint:
The following constraint ensures that there is no blocking pair of type (i).
Next we create a binary variable η k in J. If l k is full in M then η k = 1, otherwise η k is not constrained.
Next we create a binary variable δ i,k in J. If s i ∈ M (l k ), or l k prefers s i to a worst student in M (l k ) or is indifferent between them, then δ i,k = 1 in S, otherwise δ i,k is not constrained. We enforce this by imposing the following constraint:
The following constraint ensures that there is no blocking pair of type (ii).
Next we create a binary variable γ j in J. If p j is full in M then γ j = 1, otherwise γ j is not constrained.
Next we create a binary variable λ i,j,k in J. If l k prefers s i to a worst student in M (p j ) or is indifferent between them, then λ i,j,k = 1 in S, otherwise λ i,j,k is not constrained. We enforce this by imposing the following constraint:
The following constraint ensures that there is no blocking pair of type (iii).
The objective function given below is a summation of all the x i,j binary variables.
Henceforth, we denote by J the IP model comprising the objective function 17 subject to Constraints 4 -16. J can then be used to solve an instance of SPA-ST under super-stability. We define a collective notation for each set of variables involved in J as follows:
Given an instance I of SPA-ST modelled as an IP using J, we present the following lemmas regarding the correctness of J.
Lemma 9.
A feasible solution S to J corresponds to a super-stable matching M in I.
Proof. Assume firstly that the IP model J has a feasible solution S. Let M = {(s i , p j ) ∈ S × P : x i,j = 1} be the set of acceptable pairs in I generated from S. We note that M is a matching, since Constraint 4 ensures that each student in M is assigned at most one project, and Constraints 5 and 6 ensure that each project and lecturer does not exceed their capacity. We will prove that Constraints 7 -16 ensure that M is super-stable, that is M admits no blocking pair.
Suppose for a contradiction that there exists an acceptable pair (s i , p j ) that blocks M , where l k is the lecturer who offers p j . This implies that either s i is unassigned in M or prefers p j to M (s i ) or is indifferent between them. In any of these cases, p j ∈Si,j x i,j = 0. Since (s i , p j ) blocks M , we have that x i,j = 0. Thus θ i,j = 1. Now suppose (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair of type (i). This implies that each of p j and l k is undersubscribed in M . Thus n1 i =1 x i ,j < c j and n1 i =1 p j ∈P k x i ,j < d k . This implies that the RHS of Constraint 8 and the RHS of Constraint 9 is strictly greater than 0. Moreover, since S is a feasible solution to J, α j = β k = 1. Hence, the LHS of Constraint 10 is strictly greater than 2, a contradiction, since S is a feasible solution. Now suppose (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair of type (ii). This implies that p j is undersubscribed in M and as explained above, α j = 1. Also, l k is full in M and this implies that the RHS of Constraint 11 is strictly greater than 0. Since S is a feasible solution, we have that η k = 1. Furthermore, either s i ∈ M (l k ) or l k prefers s i to the worst student in M (l k ) or is indifferent between them. In any of these cases, the RHS of Constraint 12 is strictly greater than 0. Thus δ i,k = 1, since S is a feasible solution. Hence the LHS of Constraint 13 is strictly greater than 3, and thus S is not a feasible solution, a contradiction.
Finally, suppose (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair of type (iii). This implies that p j is full in M and thus the RHS of Constraint 14 is strictly greater than 0. Since S is a feasible solution, we have that γ j = 1. In addition, l k prefers s i to a worst student in M (p j ) or is indifferent between them. This implies that the RHS of Constraint 15 is strictly greater than 0. Thus λ i,j,k = 1, since S is a feasible solution. Hence the LHS of Constraint 16 is strictly greater than 2, a contradiction, since S is a feasible solution. Hence M admits no blocking pair and thus M is a super-stable matching in I. Proof. Let M be a super-stable matching in I. First we set all the variables involved in J to 0. For all (s i , p j ) ∈ M , we set x i,j = 1. As M is a matching, clearly Constraints 4, 5 and 6 are satisfied. For any acceptable pair (s i , p j ) ∈ (S ×P)\M such that s i is unassigned in M or prefers p j to M (s i ) or is indifferent between then, we set θ i,j = 1. Thus Constraint 7 is satisfied. For any project p j ∈ P that is undersubscibed in M , we set α j = 1 and thus Constraint 8 is satisfied. For any lecturer l k ∈ L that is undersubscribed in M , we set β k = 1 and thus Constraint 9 is satisfied. For Constraint 10 not to be satisfied, its LHS must be strictly greater than 2. This would only happen if there exists (s i , p j ) ∈ (S × P) \ M , where l k is the lecturer who offers p j , such that θ i,j = 1, α j = 1 and β k = 1. This implies that either s i is unassigned in M , or s i prefers p j to M (s i ) or is indifferent between them, and each of p j and l k is undersubscribed in M . Thus (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair of type (i), a contradiction to the superstability of M . Hence Constraint 10 is satisfied.
For any lecturer l k ∈ L such that l k is full in M , we set η k = 1. Thus Constraint 11 is satisfied. Let (s i , p j ) be an acceptable pair such that p j ∈ P k and (s i , p j ) / ∈ M . If s i ∈ M (l k ) or l k prefers s i to a worst student in M (l k ) or is indifferent between them, we set δ i,k = 1. Thus Constraint 12 is satisfied. Suppose Constraint 13 is not satisfied. Then there exists (s i , p j ) ∈ (S × P) \ M , where l k is the lecturer who offers p j , such that θ i,j = 1, α j = 1, η k = 1 and δ i,k = 1. This implies that either s i is unassigned in M or s i prefers p j to M (s i ) or is indifferent between them. In addition, p j is undersubscribed in M , l k is full in M and either s i ∈ M (l k ) or l k prefers s i to a worst student in M (l k )
